Texas A&M University School of Law

Texas A&M Law Scholarship
Faculty Scholarship
6-2009

Creating a Paternalistic Market for Legal Rules Affecting the
Benefit Promise
Brendan S. Maher
brendan.maher@law.tamu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar
Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons, and the Insurance Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Brendan S. Maher, Creating a Paternalistic Market for Legal Rules Affecting the Benefit Promise, 2009
Wis. L. Rev. 658 (2009).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar/1417

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Texas A&M Law Scholarship. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Texas A&M Law Scholarship. For more
information, please contact aretteen@law.tamu.edu.

CREATING A PATERNALISTIC MARKET FOR LEGAL
RULES AFFECTING THE BENEFIT PROMISE
BRENDAN S. MAHER*
Notwithstanding the fact that ERISA was enacted to protect
employee benefits, courts have narrowly construed the relief available when
benefits are denied out of concern that a stronger remedy would be too
costly for the system to bear. Judges, I argue, are ill equipped to make this
policy judgment. Instead, a regulated, subsidized, paternalistic market
should be created to permit the benefit players themselves to choose and
price the strength of the remedy they desire. This is a superior means to
reach the right level of remedial strength for the most players. To protect
against undesirably weak remedial options being selected, I propose the
market should have a highly protective default remedial option, clear
disclosure rules, subsidies, and a regulatory floor.
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Principal, Stris & Maher LLP; JD, Harvard Law School; AB, Stanford
University. This Article incorporates concepts that I initially explored in ERISA,
Agency Costs, and the Future of Health Care in the United States, 76 FORDHAM L.
REv. 2297 (2008) and in Understanding and Problematizing Contractual Tort
Subrogation, 40 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 49 (2008). It also draws upon my experience
litigating and advising on Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) cases
before the Supreme Court of the United States, namely Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic
Medical Services Inc., 547 U.S. 356 (2006) (argued by my law partner, Professor Peter
K. Stris) and LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Associates, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1020 (2008)
(also argued by Professor Stris).
This piece has benefited from the substantial input of Professor Shaun Martin at
the University of San Diego Law School, Professor John Bronsteen of the Loyola
University of Chicago Law School, and Professor Radha Pathak of Whittier Law
School, each of whom has previously written about ERISA or litigated ERISA issues
before the Supreme Court. I am very grateful for the many hours they devoted to
sharing their thoughts. Also invaluable have been the many insightful conversations I
have had over the past year and a half with attorneys from the Department of Labor and
the American Association of Retired Persons, as well as with the many participants in
talks held before organizations such as the Texas State Bar and the Association of
Pension Professionals and Actuaries. I additionally owe thanks to Professor J. J.
Prescott of the University of Michigan Law School and former Texas State Supreme
Court Justice Deborah Hankinson for their advice and support.
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I alsojoin "the risingjudicial chorus urging that Congress and
[this] Court revisit what is an unjust and increasingly tangled
ERISA regime. "
-Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg'

INTRODUCTION

The sleepy-sounding Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (ERISA) 2 is a legal iceberg. While only small portions of the
mammoth statute are readily visible to the casual observer, ERISA has
a greater impact on the course and development of the law governing
election-deciding "kitchen-table" issues-wages, pensions, and health
care-than any other single piece of the United States Code. The
Supreme Court of the United States routinely wrestles with ERISA
disputes that affect trillions of dollars, and has decided nine ERISA
cases since 2004 alone.3
For the unfamiliar, ERISA directly affects everyone who receives
health care or retirement benefits from a private employer-over 150
million Americans. 4 As health-care costs rise and America ages,

1.
Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 222 (2004) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring) (quoting DiFelice v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare,346 F.3d 442, 453 (Cal. App.

2003)).
2.
Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 26 U.S.C. and 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2006)).
3.
See Metro. Life Ins. v. Glenn, 128 S. Ct. 2343 (2008); LaRue v.
DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1020 (2008); Beck v. Pace Int'7 Union,
127 S. Ct. 2310 (2007); Howard Delivery Serv., Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 547
U.S. 651 (2006); Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677
(2006); Sereboff v. Mid At]. Med. Servs., Inc., 547 U.S. 346 (2006); Aetna Health,
542 U.S. 200; Cent. Laborers'PensionFund v. Heinz, 541 U.S. 739 (2004); Raymond
B. Yates, M.D., P.C.ProfitSharing Plan v. Hendon, 541 U.S. 1 (2004).
4.

EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RES. INST.,

FUNDAMENTALS OF EMPLOYEE BENEFIT

PROGRAMS 15 (2005), available at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/publications/books/
fundamentals/Fnd05.PrtO3.Chp2O.pdf (estimating at least 150 million); PAUL
FRONSTIN, EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RES. INST., ISSUE BRIEF No. 305, SOURCES OF HEALTH
INSURANCE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE UNINSURED:

MARCH

2006

CURRENT

POPULATION

SURVEY

UPDATED ANALYSIS OF THE

4 fig.1

(May 2007) (estimating

approximately 160 million); David A. Hyman & Mark Hall, Two Cheers for
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ERISA's heavy footprint continues to deepen, very likely quite beyond
the expectations of its drafters. Accordingly, judicial and scholarly
attention has largely focused on describing the content and contour of
ERISA's influence (such as the significance of trust law, 5 or the Act's
preemptive reach 6) in a sensible collective effort to render an opaque

statute meaningful to those subject to its considerable and everwidening dominion. This Article approaches ERISA with a very
different ambition-to change it.
To set the stage, a benefit-before receipt-is simply a promise of
deferred compensation. ERISA's animating policy judgment was that
the benefit promise needed specialized protection against breachprotection that would render benefit promises less risky to the
employee, but more costly in other ways. Yet ERISA's ambitious
prioritization of promise protection over promise cost left out a crucial
detail in a multitrillion dollar game: how steep a protection/cost tradeoff is acceptable?
This Article's proposed answer is to create a regulated, subsidized
market in which remedial rules affecting the benefit promise are chosen
and priced by the benefit players. The proposed market is paternalistic:
it "nudges" players toward a higher level of benefit protection.7

Employment-Based Health Insurance, 2 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 23, 26
(2001) (estimating 177 million).
The intersection of trust law and ERISA has, in particular, been
5.
profoundly explored by Professor Langbein. See, e.g., Daniel Fischel & John H.
Langbein, ERISA s Fundamental Contradiction: The Exclusive Benefit Rule, 55 U.
CHI. L. REv. 1105, 1108 (1988); John H. Langbein, The Supreme CourtFlunks Trusts,
1990 SuP. CT. REV. 207, 217 [hereinafter Langbein, Trusts]; John H. Langbein, Trust
Law as Regulatory Law.: The Unum/ProvidentScandal and JudicialReview of Benefit
Denials Under ERISA, 101 Nw. U. L. REV. 1315, 1342 (2007) [hereinafter Langbein,
Trust Law]; John H. Langbein, What ERISA Means By "Equitable".- The Supreme
Court's Trail of Error In Russell, Mertens, and Great-West, 103 COLUM. L. REV.
1317, 1321-38 (2003) [hereinafter Langbein, What ERISA Means].
See John Bronsteen et al., ERISA, Agency Costs, and the Future of
6.
Health Care in the UnitedStates, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2297, 2303 n.22 (2008) (noting
that many scholars have recently written about preemption).
See generally RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE:
7.
IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008) (promoting the
use of default rules that take into account cognitive biases to encourage socially
desirable choices). A narrow application of the idea of nudging benefit players into
more desirable choices was recently put into practice by the Pension Protection Act of
2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
26 and 29 U.S.C.). The Act encourages employers to enroll employees automatically in
defined-contribution plans absent an employee choosing to opt out. See id. Default
enrollment options are expected to increase employee participation in such plans
significantly. See John Beshears et al., The Importance of Default Options for
Retirement Savings Outcomes: Evidence from the United States 6-8 (Nat'l Bureau of
available at
2006),
No.
12009,
Paper
Working
Research,
Econ.
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Part I.A offers a concise historical account of ERISA as a
legislative response to a series of pension crises in the 1960s and 1970s,
briefly describes ERISA's operative contours and present-day
immensity, and sets forth the statute's explicit raison d'etre: to protect
the benefit expectations of working Americans.
Part I.B supplies the analytical framework through which the
consequences of ERISA's central policy choice and the challenges in
policy implementation are made apparent. Specifically, ERISA sought
to effect its protective aims by federalizing and increasing the
"robustness" (the likelihood of full performance) of the benefit
promise. Robustness is not free; in a reasonably well-functioning labor
market, there is a theoretical cost-wage reduction, benefit reduction,
or benefit elimination-associated with any legal rule increasing
benefit-promise robustness. The legislative justification for incurring
such a price is one of fairness and social justice; what is not evident or
immediately ascertainable from ERISA's language is the tolerable level
of cost above which robustness's presumptive supremacy should
evaporate.
Part II analyzes ERISA's central remedy for those beneficiaries
who have been denied promised benefits, and its three defining judicial
glosses: (1) the unavailability of traditional consequential damages, (2)
mandatory administrative review, and (3) deferential judicial review. In
each instance, when faced with weakly ambiguous statutory text, courts
have indulged their own policy intuitions and prioritized cost over
robustness-contrary to ERISA's intent. Unhappy with this result,
observers have criticized judicial reasoning but struggled to offer
reform proposals that can achieve the right balance between robustness
and cost.
In Part III, I offer a solution that prioritizes robustness while
accounting for cost. Specifically, I propose the creation of a regulated
"robustness market" that (1) paternalistically requires that all plans
offer a highly protective remedial option, (2) permits less protective
remedial options to be made available at discounted prices, and (3) uses
subsidies and a regulatory floor to protect weaker players. Compared to
the current system, this is a superior means to reach the right level of
benefit robustness for the most players. It takes into account varying
circumstances and individual preferences (on risk, cost, and wages) in a
way the existing regime cannot. It also provides policymakers with
more reliable information about the incremental costs associated with
various robustness levels (as well as indirect information about costs

http://www.nber.org/papers/wl2009.pdf (discussing the positive impact of default
options on defied-contribution-plan participation).
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unrelated to robustness changes). Such will be of considerable use in
establishing future policy agendas.
This Article concludes by noting that-given the growing
acknowledgement of the need for benefit reform (particularly health
care) that incorporates, to some degree, additional choice, additional
regulation, and additional government expenditure-my proposal
resonates with emerging perceptions and faces a propitious political
environment.
I. ERISA: FEDERALIZING THE BENEFIT PROMISE

In analytical terms, an employee benefit prior to receipt is simply
an (1) employer promise of (2) deferred compensation (3) in a
particular form, for example, a pension or health care.8 A benefit plan

is the operating scheme by which the benefits promise is administered
and effectuated. 9 ERISA, through a series of expansive statutory
definitions inspired by the law of trusts, federalized benefit promises
and plans in order to provide benefit "security." 10 I review the statute's
history, contours, and policy justification below.

A. History, Purpose, and Scope
Following a decade of congressional study, ERISA was enacted in
1974 in the aftermath of a string of broken benefit promises by highprofile employers.' The statute's avowed aim was to ensure that the
nation's employees and their dependents would, in the future, receive

8.
Bradley R. Duncan, JudicialReview of Fiduciary Claim Denials Under
ERISA: An Alternative to the Arbitraryand Capricious Test, 71 CORNELL L. REv. 986,
1003 (1986) (noting that benefits were formerly regarded as gifts, but are now regarded
as a portion of compensation); see also Gordon L. Clark & Ashby H.B. Monk,
Conceptualizing the Defined Pension Promise: Implications from a Survey of Expert
at
paper),
available
2007)
(unpublished
6
(July
Opinion
http:ssm.com/abstract= 1004743 (noting that Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247
(7th Cir. 1948) was a seminal case treating pension and health-care benefits as deferred
compensation).
9.
FortHalifax PackingCo. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 9 (1987).
10.
The quoted word security alludes to ERISA's title: "The Employee
Retirement Income SecurityAct of 1974" (emphasis added).
11.
Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 361
(1980) (noting that ERISA was enacted after "almost a decade of studying the Nation's
private pension plans"). In the years prior to ERISA's passage, numerous high-profile
pension plans had failed, leaving workers with little recourse. For a comprehensive
survey of the fascinating political history of ERISA, see JAMES A. WOOTEN, THE
EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974: A POLITICAL HISTORY 51-79

(2004).
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all the benefits they had been promised.'" Senator Harrison A. Williams
offered a memorably florid description of ERISA's purpose:
[A] pension reform law is now a reality because of the
hardship, deprivation and inequity suffered by American
working people .... The discipline of law will enable this
and succeeding generations of workers to face their retirement
period with greater confidence and greater security ...."
ERISA's strategy for improving benefit security was the federal
imposition of "minimum standards ... assuring the equitable character
of [benefit] plans and their financial soundness." 4 Broadly speaking,
these "minimum standards" are: (1) specific funding, vesting, and
disclosure requirements for benefit plans; (2) government insurance for
plans that fail; (3) the placement of fiduciary duties upon plan operators
and administrators; and (4) a passel of specialized statutory remedies if
ERISA provisions or plan terms are violated. 5 The foregoing
safeguards were openly held out to be necessary improvements upon
insufficient protections previously available to employees under existing
federal and state law. 16

12.
H.R. REP. No. 93-533 (1973), as reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639,
4639 ("The primary purpose of [ERISA] is the protection of individual pension rights
. . . ."). Senator Javits, an ERISA cosponsor, referred to it as a "pension 'bill of
rights.'" 120 CONG. REC. 29935 (1974) (statement of Sen. Javits); see also Larry J.
Pittman, ERISA 's Preemption Clause and the Health Care Industry: An Abdication of
Judicial Law-Creating Authority, 46 FLA. L. Rv. 355, 358-60 (1994) (noting the
primary purpose of ERISA was to protect beneficiaries); Peter J. Wiedenbeck,
ERISA 's Curious Coverage, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 311, 349 (1998) ("ERISA was enacted
to inform and protect employees.").
13.
120 CONG. REc. at 29935. The "discipline of law" later proved to be
personally challenging for Senator Williams. In the 1980s he was convicted of bribery
and conspiracy charges, for which he served time in federal prison. Douglas Martin,
Ex-Senator HarrisonA. Williams Jr., 81, Dies: Went to Prison over Abscam Scandal,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2001, at A17.
14.
29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (2006). Although ERISA's enactment was impelled
by pension-plan failures, ERISA ambitiously sweeps within its ambit more than pension
plans; it also governs employer-provided "welfare" plans. Id. § 1002(1). Together,
pension and welfare plans cover every meaningful employer benefit plan offered in
America; pension plans encompass both traditional, fixed pensions as well as 401(k)
and similar "defined contribution" plans, while welfare plans include plans that provide
health care, disability benefits, and life insurance. See id. § 1002(3).
15.
See Bronsteen et al., supra note 6, at 2310-11.
16.
S. REP. No. 93-127 (1973), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838,
4854 ("It is intended that the coverage under [ERISA] be construed liberally to provide
the maximum degree of protection for working men and women covered by private
retirement programs.").
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ERISA's draftsmen were inspired by, and borrowed heavily from,
trust law-a body of law that affords heightened protection to
promisees. That trust law was ERISA's conceptual parent, as has been
widely noted, is evident from examination of the statute's text and
construction. Employers "sponsor" plans that are, with limited
exceptions, set up as trusts. 8 All plans must have a "named fiduciary"
who need "control and manage the operation and administration of the
plan" in the best interests of the beneficiaries. 9 The named fiduciary
and the plan are, in design and practice, analogs to a trustee and a trust
(with the employees and their dependents similarly analogous to trust
beneficiaries).20
To ensure the efficacy of the ERISA legislation and its uniform
application, Congress explicitly denied, with important exceptions, the
states' authority to regulate benefit plans: "[ERISA] shall supersede any
and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any

employee benefit plan

.

...

,,2'

This explicit grant of preemption later

received an important and augmentative judicial postscript. Separate
and apart from the statute's express preemptive provision, courts
interpreting ERISA after its passage (including the Supreme Court)

17.
H.R. REP. No. 93-533 at 4649 ("The fiduciary responsibility section, in
essence, codifies and makes applicable to these fiduciaries certain principles developed
in the evolution of the law of trusts."); see also id. at 4655 ("The enforcement
provisions have been designed specifically to provide both the Secretary and
participants and beneficiaries with broad remedies for redressing or preventing
violations of the Act.").
18.
See29 U.S.C. § 1103(a), (c)(1).
19.
Id. §§ 1102(a)(1), 1104(a)(1). Of course, the named fiduciary may
designate others to assist him in the plan's operation. Id. § 1105(c). To the extent they
exercise discretion regarding management of the plan or its assets, they are considered
cofiduciaries. Id. § 1002(21)(A)(iii) (defining fiduciary as any party who "has any
discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the administration" of the plan
or its assets).
20.
See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110 (1989)
("ERISA abounds with the language and terminology of trust law."); see also Fischel &
Langbein, supra note 5, at 1108 ("The drafters of ERISA intended to apply rules and
remedies similar to those under traditional trust law to govern the conduct of
fiduciaries."); Langbein, What ERISA Means, supra note 5, at 1321-38 (describing
ERISA as a "regime of federal trust law"). Plan administrators are controlled, directly
or indirectly, by the employer. See generally Bronsteen et al., supranote 6.
21.
29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). The legislative history makes clear that the pursuit
of uniformity through preemption was intended to augment protections for participants.
120 CONG. REc. 29197 (1974) (statement of Rep. Dent) ("With the preemption of the
[benefit] field, we round out the protection afforded participants by eliminating the
threat of conflicting and inconsistent State and local regulation."); see also Boggs v.
Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 836, 840 (1997) ("[ERISA is a] congressional mandate for [the]
uniform and comprehensive regulation [of benefit plans and] the congressional scheme
to assure the security of plan participants and their families in every State.").
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have identified a separate basis for ERISA preemption of state law:
conflict preemption. Even for those state laws that fall outside of
ERISA's explicit preemptive reach, if said law is "incompatible" with
other provisions of ERISA, it is likely superseded on conflictpreemption grounds.22

Thus, today, as a consequence of both explicit congressional intent
and judicial gloss, the obligations imposed and the rights conferred
within the world of private employee-benefit plans are, with rare and
opaque exceptions, exclusively governed by a federal law written and
enacted to protect benefit recipients.23 And that world is enormous:
recent estimates are that ERISA pension plans hold over $4 trillion in
assets, while ERISA welfare plans provide health insurance for over
150 million people. 24
B. PromiseRobustness Versus Promise Cost
Let us step back from ERISA briefly and consider more broadly
the nature and risk of the benefit promise. Although benefits were once
inaccurately treated as gifts, today it is widely acknowledged that

22.
Rush PrudentialHMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 377-80 (2002)
(explaining the Court's conflict-preemption jurisprudence with respect to state laws
"held to be incompatible with ERISA's enforcement scheme"); see also Neville M.
Bilimoria, Beware HMOs: The Future of HMO Medical Malpractice Liability Is
Uncertain, 1 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 711, 716-17 (1997) (discussing ERISA
conflict preemption).
23.
See, e.g., Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141, 146-50
(2001) (holding that a state statute with a connection to ERISA plans is expressly
preempted by ERISA); UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358 (1999)
(holding that a state law "distinctively" regulating insurance is not preempted by
ERISA); Boggs, 520 U.S. at 839-54 (holding that ERISA preempts a state law allowing
a nonparticipant spouse to transfer by testamentary document the spouse's communityproperty interest in undistributed benefits); Dist. of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of
Trade, 506 U.S 125, 129-33 (1992) (holding that a state law merely referring to benefit
plans administered by ERISA is preempted by ERISA); Ingersoll-Rand Co. v.
McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 139 (1990) (noting that ERISA does not preempt certain
state garnishment or severance-pay statutes); FMC Corp. v. Holliday,498 U.S. 52, 58
(1990) (holding that ERISA preempts a state law prohibiting subrogation claims against
ERISA benefits where the plan is not "deemed" an insurance plan); Mackey v. Lanier
Collection Agency & Serv., LInc., 486 U.S. 825, 829 (1988) (holding that ERISA
preempts even state statutes designed to "help effectuate ERISA's underlying
purpose"); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47 (1987) (holding that
common-law claims relating to an employee-benefit plan are preempted by ERISA).
24.
See sources cited supra note 4; see also JOHN MACDONALD, EMPLOYEE
BENEFIT RES. INST., "TRADITIONAL" PENSION ASSETS LOST DOMINANCE A DECADE
AGO, IRAs AND 401(K)S HAVE LONG BEEN DOMINANT (2006), available at http://

www.ebri.org/pdf/publications/facts/fastfacts/fastfact020306.pdf.
course, predate the severe market crash of 2008-09.

These estimates, of
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benefits are a bargained-for component of the employer-employee labor
deal.25
Benefits have long posed a challenge for policymakers because of
their time horizon. Unlike wages, benefits are a compensation promise
where the employer's performance (paying the benefit) occurs long
after the employee labor that earned the benefit. The obvious concern is
promise-performance risk: that the employer-promisor will reap the
value of the employee-promisee's labor and then refuse to perform
(i.e., pay) on the benefit promise. The conceptual solution to the
problem of promise risk is self-evident: subject the employer-promisor
to some mix of liability and damage rules that will appropriately deter
against and/or compensate for underperformance.26
Differing legal rules governing the benefit promise, of course,
result in varying levels of promise risk. The weaker the remedy for
breach, the riskier the promise becomes to the employee. To
conveniently reference the total level of benefit-promise risk associated
with a given legal rule, I will use the term benefit-promise robustness
hereinafter. Robustness is increased if, for a considered legal rule, the
level of benefit-promise risk to a beneficiary is decreased, relative to an
alternative rule.27 Imagine you have been promised something-it does
not matter what. If you would pay a peppercorn or more to use legal
rule A over legal rule B when enforcing that promise, legal rule A is
more robust.
Robustness is not costless; increasing it has significant
consequences. A simple analytic heuristic demonstrates, in theory, what
consequences will likely flow from a legal change that increases benefit
robustness.
Benefits, as noted previously, are a portion of compensation, with
total compensation being the sum of wage earnings plus promised
benefits.28 But benefit promises come with the risk that the promisor
25.

Peter M. Rehon, The Pension Expectation as ConstitutionalProperty, 8
CONST. L.Q. 153, 170-72 (1980) ("[M]ost courts in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries viewed noncontributory private pensions plans as mere
gratuities granted at the sufferance of the employer and revocable at any time for any
reason.").
26.
See, e.g., George L. Flint, Jr., ERISA." Extracontractual Damages
Mandated for Benefit Claims Actions, 36 ARiz. L. REV. 611, 617-19 (1994)
(expressing a need under ERISA for a full measure of damages for compensatory and
deterrence purposes).
27.
I use robust with reference to its common meaning, that is, vitality,
health, or strength. I am not adopting any formal meanings of the term sometimes
employed in fields such as computer science or genetics.
28.
C = B + W, where Cis compensation, Wis wages (or salary), and Bis
the time-discounted value of the bundle of benefits being provided. See, e.g., Alan C.
Monheit & Philip F. Cooper, Health Insurance and Job Mobility." Theory and
HASTINGS
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may underpay (or not pay at all) on the promised benefits, so the
expected cost/value of promised benefits must be reduced by that
performance risk.29 Put simply, if an imaginary employer promises
$100 in benefits, but there is only a 90 percent chance the employer
will deliver on the promise, the $100 is only worth $90. Modifying
legal rules to increase the robustness of the benefit promise increases
the percentage chance that the benefit promise will be performed, and
thus the employer's expected cost of making the promise. Assume
purely for the sake of argument that ERISA increased the chance an
employer's promise of $100 in benefits would be fully paid by 5
percent. That would mean that ERISA made the benefit promise $5
more costly to the employer.
How that incremental cost is borne can vary in several ways.3"
Holding the total compensation the employer is willing to offer steady,
legal rules increasing promise robustness should have some
combination of the following effects on the employer's offer of

compensation: (1) the employer can keep the offered bundle of benefits
constant, but reduce its wage offer to pay for the increased benefit

robustness; (2) the employer can keep wages steady, but offer a
reduced bundle of benefits to pay for the increased robustness; 31 or (3)
the employer can no longer offer benefits at all, but offer higher wages
instead.3 2 More generally, increasing benefit-promise robustness will
Evidence, 48 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 68, 80 (1994) (defining compensation as "the
value of wages, health insurance, and other fringe benefits").
29.
That is, C = W + (B x P%), where P% is equal to the likelihood that
the benefit promise will be performed as expected.
30.
This is important, because often discussions of the cost of increasing
benefit security are unspecific and insufficiently cognizant of ERISA's fundamental
trade-off. Two specific matters are of import. First, Congress, having studied benefit
reform for ten years before enacting ERISA, was certainly aware that making benefit
promises more secure would result in wage and other trade-offs, but passed ERISA
anyway. See sources cited supra note 11. Increased cost was assumed. Of course, this
does not mean Congress thought wages and benefits would not both grow; the entire
total of compensation can grow-particularly if worker productivity increases-even as
the proportion of wages and benefits selected for a given level of compensation
constantly changes. Second, recognition that employers and employees are currently
making benefit/wage trade-offs is an important part of understanding the appeal of the
robusmess-market solution. See infra Part III.
31.
A reduced bundle of benefits could be expressed as narrower coverage, a
lower policy limit, a higher deductible, and so on.
32.
That is, holding C constant, if P% increases, we can expect either a
reduction in W, a reduction in B, or, in some cases, an elimination of B altogether
(with a corresponding increase in W). See, e.g., Peter M. Van Zante, Mandated
Vesting: Suppression of Voluntary Retirement Benefits, 75 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 125,
132 (1999) (noting that compensation in the form of retirement benefits will result in
lesser amounts of other forms of compensation). Which cost consequence occurs
depends on a variety of factors and is beyond the scope of this Article. But, generally
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likely lead to (1) wage reduction, (2) benefit reduction, or (3) benefit
elimination.33 Those three effects (in whatever combination) are the

conceptual "cost" of robustness; as promise robustness increases, so
does promise cost.
How that cost manifests itself in actuality across firms, sectors,
and the aggregate labor market-that is, what combination of wage
reduction, benefit reduction, and benefit elimination occurs-depends,
among other factors, on market conditions, bargaining power, the tax
status of benefit payments, and the preferences of the individual
employers and employees doing the negotiating.34 The specifics of a
promise-cost increase are empirical questions, but, analytically,
promise cost rises, in some way, with promise robustness.35 There is a
trade-off.
Returning to ERISA, Congress's animating assumptions on the
trade-off of promise robustness and promise cost were not mysterious.
ERISA was not passed because the previous state of benefits law in
1974 was that benefits promises were too robust. ERISA was enacted
for the opposite reason: Congress and virtually all experts believed
existing law in 1974 rendered the benefits promise insufficiently
robust.3 6 By imposing the minimum standards described above-vesting
speaking, benefit elimination is more likely in small firms that cannot tolerate high cost
growth in the underlying benefit, firms of any size that do not prefer the uncertainty of
benefit costs, and firms that can readily engage part-time workers in lieu of full-time
employees. See, e.g., U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, EFFORTS TO CONTROL
EMPLOYER COSTS AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR WORKERS, at introductory page, available
at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07355.pdf.
33.
The comparison is made relative to ceteris parabis, a less robust legal
scheme. Cf Sharon Rabin-Margalioth, Cross-Employee Redistribution Effects of
Mandated Employee Benefits, 20 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 311, 313 n.6 (2003)
(discussing the compensating-wage-differential theory: "[I]f there are two identical
workers in identical jobs and one is provided health insurance, the worker without
health insurance will receive higher wages.").
34.
See, e.g., Katherine Baicker & Amitabh Chandra, The Labor Market
Effects of Rising Health Insurance Premiums 15 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. Wl1160, 2005), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=673247
(discussing the empirical effect of rising health premiums on wages and full-time versus
part-time employment).
35.
For example, employees may prefer slightly lower wages to a reduction in
benefits. RICHARD IPPOLITO, THE ECONOMICS OF PENSION INSURANCE 18-19 (1989)
(noting evidence that workers accept lower cash wages in return for pensions).
Regarding robustness, certainly it is reasonable that workers would prefer slightly
lower wages over plans with reduced protection; people purchase insurance because
they value its protection against catastrophic loss more than they value the modest
increase in income they would enjoy if they forewent insurance. Indeed, if workers
value a benefit more than it costs the employer to provide it, then they would be willing
to accept a higher wage cut. See generally Dwight R. Lee, Why Workers Should Want
MandatedBenefits to Lower Their Wages, 34 ECON. INQUIRY 401 (1996).
36.
See supra notes 11-20 and accompanying text.
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rules, disclosure rules, the imposition of heightened duties, and explicit
remedies-ERISA federalized and mandated increased robustness.
Benefit promises would be clearer, more reliable, better backed,
administered with more care, and protected by special remedies.
Benefit-promise robustness was prioritized as a policy goal, in spite of
the attendant increase in promise cost.
The policy rationale for ERISA's prioritization of robustness
emerges upon consideration of the national environment at the time of
the statute's enactment. Recall that ERISA was enacted in the wake of
several high-profile pension-plan failures, leaving thousands of
employees without retirement benefits they had spent their careers
earning." Legislative sympathy for Americans put in such positions ran
understandably high. In such an environment (and since), fairness
concerns-ensuring fewer broken promises-acquired a powerful
persuasive and political appeal. Broken promises are intuitively
troubling, but particularly so in the benefit universe, where the two
largest components are health care and retirement income. Both involve
steep cliffs of marginal disutility; beneficiaries relying on a benefit
promise for health care and retirement income are particularly
vulnerable and face particularly harsh consequences in the case of
performance failure, namely, destitution or death.
Yet, if the core of ERISA's policy objective was clear-robustness
over cost-the boundaries were not.3" To wit, the consuming question
for the last three decades has been: how steep a price was Congress
willing to incur for increased robustness? ERISA's text has been, in
practice, largely unhelpful in resolving this question. The complicated,
interlocking statute is neither a model of clarity or completeness; it is a
multidimensional legal maze. In response, courts have, with surprising
frequency, aggressively interpreted a statute designed to be protective
as affording less benefit protection than equivalently reasonable

37.
See supra note 11.
38.
See, e.g., Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 262-63 (1993)
("There is ... tension between the primary [ERISA] goal of benefiting employees and
the subsidiary goal of containing pension costs." (quoting Alessi v. RaybestosManhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 515 (1981))); see also Norman Stein, ERISA and the
Limits of Equity, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 71, 73 (1993) ("[Tjhe overarching
policy decision to furnish retirement and health benefits through the private
employment market rests uneasily on competing notions: government regulation is
necessary to ensure that private law adequately delivers benefits, but too much
regulation diminishes the willingness of employers to sponsor plans at all."). Other
manifestations of cost arising from additional regulation are wage and benefit
reductions, as I explained above.
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readings of the statute's text would require.39 The result has been
judicially inspired legal rules which decrease benefit robustness.
II.

JUDGING

ERISA's

BENEFIT-DENIAL REMEDY

Although ERISA employed several statutory means by which to
shore up benefit robustness, one method-offering an explicit remedy
for benefit denial-has received a staggering amount of judicial
attention. That remedy is set forth in 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B)
("(a)(1)(B)"), and is triggered by the actual or anticipated denial of
benefits.'

39.
Joseph F. Cunningham, ERISA: Some Thoughts on Unfulfilled Promises,
49 ARK. L. REV. 83, 86 (1996) ("The extent to which the law has developed without
any consideration of ERISA's purposes, principles, language and legislative history is
remarkable, and stands as a paradigm of how federal courts should not develop
common law.").
The language provides that a participant may sue to "recover benefits due
40.
to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or
to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan." 29 U.S.C. §
1132(a)(1)(B) (2006). The other remedies commonly invoked by beneficiaries are in 29
U.S.C. §§ 1132 (a)(2)-(3). These also have significant limitations.
Section 1132(a)(2) provides a cause of action designed to recover from the
breaching fiduciary any plan monies lost or any illicit fiduciary gain and restore the
same to the plan (which may then distribute monies to the beneficiary). Id. §
1132(a)(2). Examples of (a)(2) claims include suits alleging the fiduciary imprudently
invested in the employer's stock, In re Schering-Plough Corp. ERISA Litig., 420 F.3d
231, 232-33 (3d Cir. 2005); LaLonde v. Textron, Inc., 369 F.3d 1, 2-3 (1st Cir.
2004), that the fiduciary improperly failed to diversify investments, Coan v. Kaufman,
457 F.3d 250, 253 (2d Cir. 2006), or that a fiduciary failed to account for plan liquidity
needs, GIW Indus., Inc. v. Trevor, Stewart, Burton & Jacobsen, Inc., 895 F.2d 729,
731 (11 th Cir. 1990). The (a)(2) remedy, by its terms, is triggered only by a fiduciary
breach that either inflicts a loss to the plan or nets the fiduciary illicit profits made
through use of the plan's assets; injuries to individuals that do not injure the plan are
not recoverable, and thus compensatory damages suffered solely by individuals are not
recoverable. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2).
Section 1132(a)(3) claims are limited to claims that are equitable and that were
"typically" available in premerger equity courts under the circumstances at bar.
Sereboff v. Mid Ad. Med. Servs., U.S. 126 S. Ct. 1869, 1873 (2006) (construing
(a)(3)); Brendan S. Maher & Radha Pathak, Understanding and Problematizing
Contractual Tort Subrogation, 40 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 49, 80 (2008) (discussing the
Supreme Court's (a)(3) jurisprudence). Much scholarship has been devoted to
explaining and criticizing the Supreme Court's designedly anachronistic view of (a)(3)
claims; exploring its intricacies is not necessary here. Suffice it to say that under
current Supreme Court jurisprudence, although individuals may pursue claims against
fiduciaries or others who have violated duties under the terms of the plan or under
ERISA itself, the recovery of compensatory or punitive damages is not authorized by
(a)(3). See, e.g., Colleen E. Medill, Resolving the Judicial Paradox of "Equitable"
Relief Under ERISA Section 502(A)(3), 39 J.MARSHALL L. REV. 827, 831 (2006)
("[The Supreme Court has] overreacted by embracing the law-equity paradigm,
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Examples of (a)(1)(B) claims include classic examples of benefitpromise breach: the denial of severance benefits in connection with a
sale of a corporate division, 4 the termination of disability benefits
based on a plan administrator's finding of disability status,42 the denial
of life-insurance coverage on grounds that the deceased committed
suicide,43 and, of course, the denial of coverage for particular44 medical
procedures on the grounds that they are outside plan coverage.
Importantly,
ERISA's
remedies-including
(a)(1)(B)-are
exclusive; alternate state statutory or common-law remedies in
connection with benefit denial are preempted. 45 Thus, for a beneficiary
faced with a wrongful benefit denial, (a)(1)(B) is of primary, if not
sole, importance.
The judicial construction of, and glosses on, (a)(1)(B) are
illuminative of the bench's answer to ERISA's open policy question of
how much robustness at what price. As explained below, the remedy
has been narrowly construed by the courts in three crucial ways: (1)

resulting in a rigid rule that only remedies 'typically' available in a court of equity are
available under Section 502(a)(3).").
41.
See, e.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 498 U.S. 101, 105-06
(1989). Other decisions involving (a)(1)(B) severance denials include Colucci v. Agfa
Corp. Severance Pay Plan, 431 F.3d 170 (4th Cir. 2005); Dabertin v. HCR Manor
Care, Inc., 373 F.3d 822, 824, 826 (7th Cir. 2004); Cassidy v. Akzo Nobel Salt, Inc.,
308 F.3d 613, 614-15 (6th Cir. 2002).
42.
See, e.g., Groves v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 438 F.3d 872, 874-75 (8th
Cir. 2006) (finding that disability benefits were properly denied where the employee
could perform some work).
43.
See, e.g., Critclow v. First UNUM Life Ins. Co. ofAm., 378 F.3d 246,
259-61 (2d Cir. 2004) (finding that a policy covered death because the deceased did not
intend to kill himself).
44.
See, e.g., Manny v. Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension & Health &
Welfare Funds, 388 F.3d 241, 244, 246-47 (7th Cir. 2004) (finding that gastric bypass
surgery was not covered because it was "cosmetic"). Benefit claims contesting medicalcoverage denials are perhaps the most common type of (a)(1)(B) claim. See Kathryn J.
Kennedy, The Perilous and Ever-ChangingProceduralRules of Pursuing an ERISA
Claims Case, 70 UMKC L. REv. 329, 329 (2001) ("[It has actually become
commonplace to see certain health benefits denied to claimants on various theories,
e.g., medical necessity, investigatory/experimental exclusions, and other analogous
cost-containment provisions."); see also Bronsteen et al., supra note 6, at 2304-19
(arguing that various factors increase the likelihood that wrongful denials will occur
most frequently in a health-insurance setting).
45.
See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54 (1987) ("The
deliberate care with which ERISA's civil enforcement remedies were drafted and the
balancing of policies embodied in its choice of remedies argue strongly for the
conclusion that ERISA's civil enforcement remedies were intended to be exclusive.").
The Court has not backed away from this sentiment in the two decades since PilotLife
was decided. See, e.g., Rush PrudentialHMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 378
(2002) ("We concluded that Congress had not intended causes of action under ERISA
itself beyond those specified in § 1132(a).").
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traditional consequential damages are unavailable, (2) the exhaustion of
internal review of a denial by the plan fiduciary is a precondition to
suit, and (3) courts defer to a plan administrator's benefit decisions.
These significant curtailments have left ERISA beneficiaries with a
benefit-denial remedy that undermines, rather than strengthens, benefit
protection. Consequential damages would increase protection by
furthering compensatory and deterrence aims, elective internal review
would increase protection by not obstructing a beneficiary's path to an
impartial adjudicator, and de novo judicial review would increase
protection by decreasing the likelihood of biased or negligent decisions
by the plan administrator. The judicial rejection of those robustnessincreasing legal rules is (1) largely unconnected to strictly textual
readings of ERISA, (2) in tension with Congress's animating policy
assumption in enacting the statute, and (3) indulgent of unreliable
judicial policy intuitions about the dangers of increasing promise cost.
A. No TraditionalConsequentialDamages
ERISA's current legal rule on damages for benefit denial or
mishandling surprises the casual observer. For example, if a plan
wrongfully denies a participant medical treatment, and as a result of
that denial the participant's condition worsens, an (a)(1)(B) action is
understood to be limited to the value of the denied benefit. 6 Recovery
of traditional consequential damages is not permitted. The favored
rationale for this view is textual; the statutory phrase "benefits due...
under the terms of the plan" does not include "extracontractual"

46.
As the Supreme Court explained in MassachusettsMutual Life Insurance
Co. v. Russell:
Significantly, the statutory provision explicitly authorizing a beneficiary to
bring an action to enforce his rights under the plan-§ 502(a)(1)(B) ...
says nothing about the recovery of extracontractual damages, or about the
possible consequences of delay in the plan administrators' processing of a
disputed claim. Thus, there really is nothing at all in the statutory text to
support the conclusion that such a delay gives rise to a private right of
action for compensatory or punitive relief.
473 U.S. 134, 144 (1985). Although Russell involved an (a)(2) claim, not an
(a)(1)(B) claim, the lower courts of appeals understood Russell to bar the recovery of
consequential or punitive damages under (a)(1)(B). See, e.g., Medina v. Anthem Life
Ins. Co., 983 F.2d 29, 31 (5th Cir. 1993) (relying on Russell and granting no punitive
or consequential damages under (a)(1)(B)); Reinking v. Phila. Am. Life Ins. Co., 910
F.2d 1210, 1220 (4th Cir. 1990) (same); see also Richard Rouco, Available Remedies
Under ERISA Section 502(a), 45 ALA. L. REv. 631, 648 (1994) ("[The Russell
Court's] observations on the structure and legislative history of ERISA outlined a
position which significantly influenced the [(a)(1)(B)] constructions adopted by lower
courts.").
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consequential or punitive damages. 4" Thus, because the "terms of [a]
plan" only explicitly promise an entitlement to benefits, and
consequential damages are not benefits, they are not recoverable under
(a)(1)(B).
The notion that (a)(1)(B) prohibits consequential damages has been
criticized by commentators (including myself) on multiple grounds. 8
The immediate trouble is textual; the very terms of (a)(1)(B) provide a
cause of action for a beneficiary to "recover benefits due" as well as to
"enforce his rights under the terms of the plan." 49 The "right" to a
"benefit" was originally conferred, depending on one's view, under
principles of contract or trust. So as to prevent inadequate
compensation and insufficient deterrence in case of breach, rights
conferred by contract or trust fundamentally include both the right itself

and a right of (foreseeable) consequential damages (or the functional
equivalent) for interference with the right."0 The notion that ERISA's
drafters-seeking as they were to increase legal protections-wrote
ERISA with the intent to shear off the consequential-damages
component of the benefit right is facially suspect and inconsistent with
ERISA's legislative history. 5 ' The statute in fact says nothing about
limiting consequential damages; presumably it would have announced
such a notable departure from the long-settled legal understanding
governing the dual nature of a right.
47.
Conover v. Aetna US Health Care, Inc., 320 F.3d 1076, 1080 (10th Cir.
2003) ("Nowhere does the Employee Retirement Income Security Act allow
consequential or punitive damages. Damages are limited to the recovery of benefits due
...under the terms of the plan."); Harsch v. Eisenberg,956 F.2d 651, 655 (7th Cir.
1992) (denying consequential damages because the beneficiaries were limited to
"contractual claims by providing only for actions based upon or arising 'under the
terms of the plan"'); Drinkwater v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 846 F.2d 821, 824 (1st Cir.
1988) (noting that damages are "extracontractual" if not "within the terms" of the
plan).
48.
Bronsteen et al., supra note 6, at 2327-28; see also Flint, supra note 26,
at 647 (noting that a judicial conclusion wherein consequential damages were not
available "is pure fiction-caused either by vicious judicial and legal subterfuge or,
more likely, gross judicial and legal malpractice on the part of [the] Supreme Court").
49.
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2006).
50.
See, e.g., Flint, supra note 26, at 611; see also Richard A. Epstein &
Alan 0. Sykes, The Assault on Managed Care: Vicarious Liability, Class Actions and
the Patient's Bill of Rights 26 (University of Chicago, Law & Econ. Working Paper
No. 112, 2000), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=253328 (noting a need for
consequential damages under ERISA "has considerable force, and may in the end be
convincing").
51.
Dana M. Muir, FiduciaryStatus as an Employer's Shield: The Perversity
of ERISA FiduciaryLaw, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 391, 461 (2000) (criticizing the
judiciary's narrow construction of ERISA remedies because ERISA's text and
legislative history provides "the basis for recovery of foreseeable consequential
damages").
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Context strengthens the argument. Timely delivery is a more
pronounced expectation for a benefit promise (compared to other types
of promises), because benefit delay in health care and retirement has
acute consequences. Withheld retirement benefits, for recipients who
have no other means of producing income, is a very severe financial
harm. Delay or denial of health-care payments, of course, can result in
serious injury or death. Benefit promises, more so than other promises,
are likely to decline precipitously in value if promise performance is
delayed significantly. The inherent expectation in being the beneficiary
of such a promise is that the promise will be performed in a timely
fashion; one would expect, on both compensatory and deterrence
grounds, for the available damages remedy to reflect that reality.
It is puzzling that a statute designed to protect beneficiaries would
be interpreted in a way that actively frustrates compensatory and
deterrence aims. The puzzle evaporates if one concludes-as industry
groups have seemingly persuaded courts-that promise-cost concerns
associated with permitting consequential damages are significant
enough to overcome ERISA's presumption of benefit robustness.52
B. Mandatory "Administrative"Review
Although the Supreme Court has not yet addressed the issue, the
federal courts of appeals are largely in agreement that a participant
bringing an (a)(1)(B) claim must first exhaust any internal review
process provided for under the plan.53 One expects a favorable
reception for the doctrine when it reaches the Supreme Court; recently,
in LaRue v. DeWolff,Boberg & Associates, Inc., 54 Chief Justice John
Roberts's widely noted concurrence spoke approvingly of ERISA's

52.
Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 148 n.17 (1985)
(rejecting extracontractual damages and noting that "Congress was concerned lest the
cost of federal standards discourage the growth of private pension plans"). Industry
groups routinely file amicus briefs before the Supreme Court (and the appellate courts)
arguing that changes in damage rules will have devastating financial effects. See, e.g.,
Margaret Cyr-Provost, Note, Aetna v. Davila: From Patient-CenteredCare to PlanCentered Care, A Signpost or the End of the Road?, 6 HOus. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y
171, 203-04 (2005) (noting that the American Association of Health Plans and the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce have filed amicus briefs before the Supreme Court urging that
consequential damages have strong effects on the "cost of co-payments, deductibles,
and premiums"). In my personal experience, industry and business groups have
unfailingly asserted that stronger ERISA remedies will result in unacceptably high
costs.
53.
See Kennedy, supra note 44, at 358-59 n. 158 (collecting decisions holding
the administrative-exhaustion requirement in benefit-denial cases).
128 S.Ct. 1020, 1027 (2008).
54.
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administrative-exhaustion requirement as an important "safeguard[] for
plan administrators.""
Yet, nowhere does ERISA's text require administrative
exhaustion. 6 The operative provision provides that plans "afford a
reasonable opportunity to any participant whose claim for benefits has
been denied for a full and fair review by the appropriate named
fiduciary of the decision denying the claim." 57 The most popular
judicial rationale justifying an exhaustion precondition to suit is one of
odd implication: that, by including a provision that requires plans to
offer administrative-review procedures, Congress impliedly intended
that participants be required to use it. As the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit put it, in the oft-cited Amato v. Bernard58
case, "[It would] be anomalous if the same good reasons that
presumably led Congress and the Secretary to require covered plans to
provide administrative remedies for aggrieved claimants did not lead
courts to see that those remedies are regularly used."59
At least as strong as the Ninth Circuit's "presumption" is the
opposite one-that Congress had "good reasons" to mean exactly what

it wrote, which was for participants to have the opportunity for
administrative

review. 6

By its terms,

an opportunity is not a

55.
Id. at 1027 (Roberts, J., concurring).
56.
It is misleading to refer to the requirement as "administrative" exhaustion.
Internal review by plan fiduciaries bears little or no resemblance to genuine
administrative review. See Donald T. Bogan, Reply to Judge Easterbrook: The
UnsupportedDelegation of Conflict Adjudication in ERISA Benefit Claims Under the
Guise of JudicialDeference, 57 OKLA. L. REv. 21, 27 (2004); Mark D. DeBofsky, The
Paradox of the Misuse of Administrative Law in ERISA Benefit Claims, 37 J.
MARSHALL L. REv. 727, 729-31 (2004). Nonetheless, I will often use the term
administrativeto reflect the dominant, if erroneous, nomenclature.
57.
29 U.S.C. § 1133(2) (2006) (emphasis added).
58.
618 F.2d 559 (9th Cir. 1980).
59.
Id. at 567. That argument could likewise be justified to construe the
statute in the opposite direction; that, as Congress explicitly granted litigation remedies,
they should be as regularly used as possible.
60.

Much has been made of the fact that ERISA's legislative history says that

with respect to suits to enforce benefit rights under the plan or to recover
benefits under the plan ... [a]ll such actions in Federal or State courts are
to be regarded as arising under the laws of the United States in similar
fashion to those brought under section 301 of the Labor-Management
Relations Act of 1947.
H.R. REP. No. 1280, at 327 (1973) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 5107. Courts have interpreted this snippet to mean that the
administrative-exhaustion requirement established under section 301 of the LaborManagement Relations Act (LMRA) applies to ERISA claims. See, e.g., Barrowclough
v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 752 F.2d 923, 939 (3d Cir. 1985); Amato, 618 F.2d at
567-68. Such is an ambitious misreading of two sentences of legislative history. See,
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requirement. Nor, tellingly, does the text of (a)(1)(B)-that is, the text
of the remedy itself-require that the opportunity be seized before
commencing suit.6 ' Rather, the text of (a)(1)(B) never mentions 29
U.S.C. § 1133.62 Had Congress desired administrative review to be
mandatory prior to commencement of suit, one suspects it would have
said so (as it has elsewhere).63
Providing an option of administrative review also makes policy
sense, given ERISA's core objective of protecting employees. Lawsuits
are expensive, and, particularly for small claims, not cost-justified for
participant-claimants. Were a lawsuit the claimant's only option,
wrongful denials of smaller claims might never be contested at all. For
larger claims, the calculus is different. ERISA's tolerance of conflicted
administrators becomes very relevant. 4 The likely complicated nature
of a high-value claim and the heightened possibility of bias combine to
undermine the chance that internal review will result in fair resolution
of the claim.65 Moreover, to the extent that a factual record is created
e.g., Jay Conison, Suits for Benefits Under ERISA, 54 U. PITT. L. REv. 1, 17 (1992)
("[Contrary to perceptions,] the reference to section 301 of the LMRA does not mean
that courts should import into ERISA the specific rules that have been developed under
section 301. Neither the Conference Report nor any other document suggests that
Congress intended such a result or that such a reading of the passage is even remotely
plausible."); G. Richard Shell, ERISA and Other FederalEmployment Statutes: When
Is Commercial Arbitration an "Adequate Substitute" for the Courts?, 68 TEX. L. Rnv.
509, 559 (1990) (arguing that the passage merely refers to whether ERISA actions arise
under federal law rather than state law).
61.
See 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (a)(1)(B).
See id.
62.
63.
Compare id., with id. § 411 (a)(4) (discussing the exhaustion requirement
in the statutory text of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959).
ERISA, as written, does not require that plan fiduciaries be independent
64.
from the employer (the "plan sponsor"). See id. § 1108(c)(3). Employers can and often
do serve as, or control, plan fiduciaries. See Donovan v. Bierwirth, 538 F. Supp. 463,
468 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (stating the legislative history is clear that a "party-in-interest
may serve as a fiduciary in addition to being an officer" (quoting H.R REP. No. 1280
(1973))); Fischel & Langbein, supra note 5, at 1126 ("[T]he statute leaves the plan
sponsor to pick the fiduciary and, if the sponsor pleases, to do it from the ranks of
management. Sponsors routinely exercise this authority."). That ERISA tolerates the
possibility (and indeed the likelihood) of such conflicted fiduciaries has been roundly
criticized by observers. See Bronsteen et al., supra note 6, at 2300; Cunningham, supra
note 39, at 90 (describing benefit determinations by conflicted fiduciaries as a
"kangaroo court"); Norman Stein, Three andPossibly FourLessons About ERISA that
We Should, but Probably Will Not, Learn from Enron, 76 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 855, 869
(2002) (noting that fiduciaries prioritize their own interests).
Lord Eldon, high chancellor of Britain in the nineteenth century, pithily
65.
expressed the appeal of competent counsel generally: "Truth is best discovered by
powerful statements on both sides of the question." William W. Schwarzer, Dealing
with Incompetent Counsel- The TrialJudge's Role, 93 HARv. L. REv. 633, 636 (1980)
(quoting Lord Eldon).
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upon which a reviewing court later relies, a claimant who chooses to
proceed through the administrative-review process without any
assistance from counsel may be considerably disadvantaged when the
matter is litigated.
Given ERISA's protective intent, it is unlikely that Congress
intended for administrative review to be a necessary precondition for a
lawsuit, particularly for a large benefit dispute involving complicated
considerations. 6 More likely is that Congress (correctly) assumed that
beneficiaries themselves would assess whether their claims were lowvalue, simple claims easily resolvable through administrative review, or
whether their claims were high-value, sophisticated claims more
amenable to fair resolution through litigation, and act accordingly.
Indeed, that is entirely harmonious with ERISA's stated intent of
protecting participants' interests. Making administrative review elective
also serves as a sensible counterbalance to ERISA's tolerance of
conflicted fiduciaries. In contrast, it is difficult to view the dominant
judicial interpretation, based on a thin textual reed of negative
implication, as anything more than an implicit policy judgment that
elective administrative review is simply "too costly" to be worth it. 67
C. JudicialDeference
The third crucial judicial gloss upon ERISA's benefit-denial
remedy is judicial deference to a plan administrator's decision to deny
benefits. In the landmark ERISA case Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v.
Bruch,68 at issue was the denial of severance entitlement in connection
with the sale of a corporate division. 69 Firestone's position was that
ERISA itself imbued Firestone with the sole discretion to make planbenefit determinations, including on the litigated question of severance
entitlement.7" Firestone accordingly urged judicial deference; the suing
employees urged de novo review.7 1 As ERISA's text supplies no

66.
Conison, supra note 60, at 29 (arguing that legislative history proves that
internal review was intended to be an alternate, not necessary, option for claimants).
67.
See, e.g., Wilczynski v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 93 F.3d 397, 402
(7th Cir. 1996) (noting that mandatory administrative review prevents frivolous lawsuits
and decreases "the cost and time of claims settlement").
68.
489 U.S. 101 (1989).
69.
Id.
70.
Id. at 112-13.
71.
Id. at 114.
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standard of review for benefit determinations, the Court was forced to
articulate one.72
The Court ruled that the appropriate level of judicial review of
benefit-determination decisions was de novo review, and explained that
a deferential standard of review "would afford less protection to
employees and their beneficiaries than they enjoyed before ERISA was
enacted." 73 Nonetheless, in a momentous and fateful detour, the Court
explained that deferential review would be appropriate where "the
benefit plan gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority
to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the
plan."7 4 Firestone's weak caveat was that, "if a benefit plan gives
discretion to an administrator or fiduciary who is operating under a
conflict of interest, that conflict must be weighed as a 'facto[r] in
determining whether there is an abuse of discretion.'" 75 Plans, given the
judicial green light to draft themselves into a favorable abuse-ofdiscretion world of review, did so en masse.76
Firestone has long been sharply criticized by observers, such as
Professor John Langbein, who described Firestone's command of
deferential review when plan terms confer discretion on the fiduciary as
"an ill-considered aside." 77 Others noted that deference to ERISA
administrators is not supported by the specific rationales that favor
judicial deference in other settings, such as where a donative trustee or
government agency is imbued with discretion. 71 I (with Professors John
Bronsteen and Peter Stris) have argued elsewhere that, because of the
structure of ERISA, virtually all plan fiduciaries are afflicted with
agency risk; that is, they are biased either obviously or subtly in favor
of the plan sponsor, and that such agency risk imperils ERISA's
72.
The decision expressly limited itself to (a)(1)(B) actions. Id. at 108 ("We
express no view as to the appropriate standard of review for actions under other
remedial provisions of ERISA.").
73.
Id.at 113-14.
74.
Id.at 115.
75.
Id.(quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187, cmt. d (1959)).
76.
In the wake of Firestone, Professor Langbein predicted that most plans
would thereafter award discretion to their administrators so as to secure more
permissive judicial review-which is precisely what happened. See Langbein, Trusts,
supra note 5, at 220. Similarly, post-Firestone, defense counsel immediately advised
that "[pilan sponsors and drafters should craft new plans, and review and amend
existing ones, to incorporate this elective deferential review of benefit claims
decisions." Michael S. Beaver, The Standard of Review in ERISA Benefits Denial
Cases After Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch: Revolution Or Dj,! Vu? 26 TORT
& INS. L.J. 1, 1 (1990).
77.
Langbein, Trust Law, supra note 5, at 1342; see also id.at 1338-39
("ERISA's regime of judicial review of fiduciary decision making of benefit denials
ought... to be understood as beyond the reach of self-serving plan terms.").
78.
See supra note 56.
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legislative aims in general-a problem aggravated by deferential
review.7 9
Firestone's much criticized standard of review spawned a torrent
of litigation on two fronts: first, how to determine when a legally
cognizable conflict of interest exists; and second, how to "weigh" the
conflict as a "factor." The federal circuits differed widely in their
conclusions.8" Only last term, in Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v.
Glenn,8" did the Supreme Court confront both issues.
Glenn involved the denial of disability benefits by an insurance
company, MetLife, that both administered and paid benefits for an
employee-welfare plan offered by employer Sears Roebuck. 2 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that MetLife
suffered from a conflict of interest before concluding that MetLife had
acted arbitrarily and capriciously in denying benefits." The Supreme
Court affirmed. 4
The Glenn decision offered two holdings of significance. First, it
held that there is a conflict of interest when the fiduciary both
determines eligibility for and pays out claims.85 Second, the Court
declined to change the "abuse of discretion" standard of review.86 That
is, even assuming a conflict exists, the abuse-of-discretion standard still
applies.8 7 However, courts must now consider how severe the conflict
is as part of the process of determining whether an abuse of discretion
occurred. 88 Thus, for example, if claims administrators are "wall[ed]
off' from the plan's finance personnel, the conflict matters less than if
"circumstances" raise concern that a conflict "affected" the decision to
deny benefits.8 9 The Court explicitly declined to give further specifics
on how to weigh conflicts, explaining that there are no "talismanic
79.
See generallyBronsteen et al., supra note 6 (arguing ERISA's tolerance of
conflicted fiduciaries negatively affects the delivery of health care in America).
80.
See Donald T. Bogan & Benjamin Fu, ERISA: No FurtherInquiry into
Conflicted Plan Administrator Claim Denials, 58 OKLA. L. REv. 637, 652-54 n.71
(2005) (discussing the standards of "conflict" review across circuits).
81.
128 S. Ct. 2343 (2008).
Id. at 2346-47.
82.
83.
Glenn v. MetLife, 461 F.3d 660, 674 (6th Cir. 2006). MetLife disputed
that a conflict existed. Id. at 666.
84.
128 S. Ct. at 2352.
85.
Id. at 2348 (finding the existence of a conflict where a "plan administrator
both evaluates claims for benefits and pays benefits claims").
86.
Id. at 2350.
87.
Id. at 2346 ("[T]he significance of the [conflict) will depend upon the
circumstances of the particular case.").
88.
Id. Precisely how this will differ in practice from Firestone's standard is
not clear.
89.
Id. at 2351.
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words that can avoid the process of judgment,"' and thus no "one-sizefits-all procedural system that is likely to promote fair and accurate
review. ,91
The immediate problem with the Court's reasoning is that there is
a procedural system likely to promote fair and accurate review: de novo
review. Aside from the obvious merit of itself being "fair and
accurate," de novo review has the additional benefit of consonance with
ERISA's language. Recall that 29 U.S.C. § 1133 requires that a
participant have an opportunity for "full and fair" internal review.9 De
novo review increases the likelihood that internal administrative review
will actually be full and fair because it incentivizes plans to practice
scrupulously fair decision making (so as to reduce the chance of costly
litigation). Absent this cost deterrent, benefit decision makers are less
likely to invest the time and care needed to avoid mistakes, and are
more likely to succumb to the temptation of self-interested decisions."
De novo judicial review, as an impartial check, considerably increases
the odds that administrative review will be full and fair in the first
instance.94
Arguments not explicitly made in Glenn but commonly advanced
in favor of judicial deference deserve some attention. One theory is that
plan administrators are more familiar with the plan and thus better
positioned to resolve plan meaning than judges, whose exposure to plan
language is "episodic and occasional. "95 However, that an administrator
is facile with plan terms does not address, at all, whether he will
provide fair review to a given beneficiary, as ERISA requires. Facility
is not fairness, and the reality is that most if not all fiduciaries are

90.
Id. at 2345 (quoting Universal Camera Corp. v.NLRB,340 U.S. 474,
489 (1951)).
91.
Id. at 2351. A simple summary of Glenn's standard might be: "Courts
have wide discretion to determine when there is an abuse of discretion." Justice Scalia,
in his dissent, was unimpressed with the Court's amorphous test, comparing it to
"chuck[ing things] into a brown paper bag and shak[ing them] up to determine the
answer." Id. at 2358 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
92.
29 U.S.C. § 1133 (2006).
See George Lee Flint, Jr., ERISA: Reformulating the Federal Common
93.
Law for Plan Interpretation, 32 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 955, 960 (1995) (noting that
judicial deference is "extremely detrimental to litigating participants denied benefits");
see also Cunningham, supra note 39, at 90 (criticizing deference to biased
administrators).
94.
In a world of elective administrative review, de novo judicial review also
makes it more likely that participants-who are themselves cost sensitive-will perceive
administrative review as likely to be fair, and thus choose it over suit.
See, e.g., Berry v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 761 F.2d 1003, 1006 (4th Cir.
95.
1985); see also Brogan v.Holland, 105 F.3d 158, 164 (4th Cir. 1997).
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conflicted.96 Moreover, ERISA intends for the benefit promise to be
expressed in a fashion comprehensible to the "average plan
participant. "' The average plan participant has, at best, an "episodic
and occasional" exposure to plan language. From this perspective, a
judge's lack of day-to-day familiarity with a particular plan's terms
makes the court a superior, rather than inferior, interpretative arbiter.
Another oft-suggested justification for deference relies upon a
comparison to common-law trusts.9" There, a settlor may confer
discretion on a trustee, and courts defer to the trustee's discretion in
such an instance. 99 The wishes of the settlor, who supplies the trust res,
are presumptively reflected in the discretion of the trustee, and thus
entitled to judicial deference."0 So too should be the rule in ERISA, or
so the argument goes. There are at least two flaws in this reasoning.
First, under ERISA, the employees can more accurately be thought of
as playing the role of the settlor. Although the employer is nominally
the settlor, the employees are the effective settlors, as they are the ones
96.
See generally Bronsteen et al., supra note 6, at 2297, 2299; see also
Langbein, Trust Law, supra note 5, at 1316 ("Most ERISA plan benefit denials are the
work of conflicted decisionmakers.").
97.
29 U.S.C. § 1022 (a) requires that:
A summary plan description of any employee benefit plan shall be
furnished to participants and beneficiaries .... The summary plan
description shall include [material information about benefit terms], shall be
written in a manner calculated to be understood by the average plan
participant, and shall be sufficiently accurate and comprehensive to
reasonably apprise such participants and beneficiaries of their rights and
obligations under the plan.
See also 29 C.F.R. § 2520.102-2 (2008) (setting forth U.S. Department of Labor
requirements and recommendations on the appropriate language of summary plan
descriptions). Where there is conflict between the language of the plan document itself
and the language of the summary plan description, the language of the summary plan
description governs. See, e.g., Price v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 2 F.3d
986, 988 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating the summary plan description governs); Hansen v.
Cont'l Ins. Co., 940 F.2d 971, 982 (5th Cir. 1991) (same); Edwards v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 851 F.2d 134, 136 (6th Cir. 1988) (same); McKnight v. S. Life
& Health Ins. Co., 758 F.2d 1566, 1570 (1lth Cir. 1985) (same).
98.
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 113-14 (1989)
(noting the private-trust rationale was offered in this case).
99.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 (1959) ("Where discretion is
conferred upon the trustee with respect to the exercise of a power, its exercise is not
subject to control by the court except to prevent an abuse by the trustee of his
discretion.").

100.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS

§ 4 (2003) ("The phrase 'terms of the

trust' means the manifestation of intention of the settlor with respect to the trust
provisions expressed in a manner that admits of its proof in judicial proceedings."); see
also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 10.1 (2001) ("The controlling consideration in determining the meaning of a donative
document is the donor's intention.").
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funding the trust with foregone wage compensation.' One struggles to
justify a presumption that employees would wish to limit the reviewing
power of an impartial judge regarding a benefit denial. 1°u Second,
ERISA was created to enhance protections for employees; that
employers could, through drafting, "impose a standard of review that
would afford less protection to employees and their beneficiaries than
they enjoyed before ERISA was enacted" 11 3 without ceding anything in
return runs counter to ERISA's purpose and finds no support in
ERISA's text or legislative history. 0"
Also periodically argued is that administrators are ideally equipped
to balance the needs of current benefit claimants with future claimants,
and thus deserving of deference from judges.'05 This argument assumes
that resources saved by denying one claim will be shifted to other
claimants. Common circumstances suggest otherwise. For example,
where an insurance company is the payer of health benefits, a claim
denied is simply money the insurance company does not pay out.
Nothing requires the insurance company to set aside that saved money
for the benefit of other potential claimants. Similarly, in a definedbenefit pension plan, the employer is effectively the residual beneficiary

101.
See supra Part I.B. This is true (controlling for tax effects) even of
employer contributions. Money the employer contributes is still functionally foregone
compensation. Cf Albert de Roode, Pensions as Wages, 3 Am. ECON. REv. 287, 287
(1913) ("A pension system ... is really paid by the employee, not perhaps in money,
but in the foregoing of an increase in wages which he might obtain except for the
establishment of a pension system."); see also supra Part I.A.
102. The exception is where an employee believes the cost of additional
protections is greater than the risk of loss associated with a review scheme having
weaker judicial review. See infra Part III.
103. Firestone, 489 U.S. at 114.
104. Trust law is also a poor analog regarding deference because it
presupposes, generally, the presence of an unconflicted trustee, and because it fails to
account for ERISA's regulatory intent (as opposed to the contractarian nature of trust
law). See Langbein, Trust Law, supra note 5, at 1326-27, 1343. For a detailed
exploration of the negative impact ERISA's tolerance of conflicted trustees has had on
America's health-care system, see generally Bronsteen et al., supra note 6.
105. See, e.g., E. Haavi Morreim, Benefits Decisions in ERISA Plans:
Diminishing Deference to Fiduciaries and an Emerging Problem for ProviderSponsored Organizations, 65 TENN. L. Rv. 511, 524 (1998) (arguing the fiduciary is
ideally suited "to honor the competing claims of the plan's other and future
beneficiaries"). Courts sometimes express this idea in terms of a fiduciary's duty to the
plan as a collective entity. See, e.g., Barnhart v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 179
F.3d 583, 589 (8th Cir. 1999) ("Fiduciary obligations extend primarily to the plan as it
relates to all beneficiaries, not just to individual claimants."). In addition to the other
difficulties mentioned in the text, a further problem with this argument is that it proves
too much. Put simply, it will always justify-absent hyperclear plan terms-denying
benefits. It is unlikely that was Congress's goal when passing ERISA.
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when payouts are minimized."°6 Nor, in any event, is there a
compelling reason to believe decision makers denying benefit claims
are routinely making long-term judgments about the effect granting or
denying a given claim will have on the ability to pay future classes of
claims.
The most compelling explanation as to why deferential review has
survived for almost two decades is that courts have simply concluded
that the alternative, de novo review, is not worth the extra cost. This
conclusion was acknowledged in Glenn, where Justice Stephen Breyer
assumed the increase in costs would be so enormous that a de novo rule
would only be justifiable had ERISA affirmatively required such a
standard (which it did not). Justice Breyer's memorable formulation of
the point was: "Congress does not hide elephants in mouseholes." °7
Yet, de novo review may, for some benefit-plan participants, be an

elephant worth the price of admission. To that possibility I turn next.
III. A "ROBUSTNESS MARKET"
ERISA prioritizes robustness over cost but fails to specify by how
much.' Courts have failed to strike a balance that seems consistent
with ERISA's purpose. 0 9 The solution is to create a paternalistic,
regulated, subsidized "market" for robustness.11 ° I propose that
Congress amend ERISA (and other necessary law) as follows."'
106. Minimized payouts, like exceptional investment performance, can reduce
future funding obligations. See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, Employees, Pensions, and the
New Economic Order, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 1519, 1519, 1542 (1997) (discussing a
range of ways in which "[ iun the historically dominant defined benefit pension plan, the
sponsoring firm, not the employee, is the residual claimant").
107.
Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 128 S. Ct. 2343, 2351 (2008) (quoting
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'n, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001)). In fairness, Justice
Breyer was alluding to both increased costs of plan administration (which would have
the effects described supra Part II.B) as well as increased burdens on the courts (which
would not have those effects).
108.
See supra Part I.
109. See supraPart II.
110. I should be careful to note that I sketch in this Part a new conceptual
approach, not a concrete plan of reform regarding every detail of implementation.
Obviously implementation specifics will vary depending on the benefits at issue, the
type of plan, and plan size, among many other factors. I do not intend to resolve here,
for example, the ideal way of charging for alternative robustness options in a definedbenefit pension plan, or whether there should be exemptions for businesses or plans
below a certain size.
111. There is no constitutional obstacle to Congress passing legislation that
permits parties to an agreement to select (within limits) damages or the appropriate
standard of review. Lee Goldman, Contractually Expanded Review of Arbitration
Awards, 8 HARv. NEGOT. L. REv. 171, 188 (2003) (noting there is "no independent
constitutional argument against" selecting a level of judicial review).
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First, require that any employee-benefit plan must offer a threepronged, highly robust, default remedial option of (1) elective
administrative review, (2) de novo judicial review, and (3)
consequential damages for benefit denials. 112 Second, permit plans to
offer lower-priced, lower-robustness options-for example, mandatory
administrative review, deferential judicial review, or no consequential
damages13-to those participants willing to opt out from the highrobustness baseline remedial option." 4 Third, require the offer of the
less robust options to be explained in a manner comprehensible to the
average plan participant. Fourth, establish a regulatory floor for
minimum robustness levels, to be administered by the U.S. Department
of Labor (and subject to agency adjustment based on varying individual
and market conditions)."' Fifth, subsidize robustness choices made by
plan participants of lower income levels.
In Part III.A below, I explore the fundamental attraction of a
robustness market; in Part III.B, I argue that anchoring the market to a
high-robustness default is appropriate, given ERISA's original and still
valid objective; in Part III.C, I address concerns about market
imperfections and propose legislative and regulatory mechanisms to
safeguard against undesirable market outcomes.

112. ERISA currently does not require that an employer offer a plan. I do not
opine on whether that should change; merely that, to the extent an employee-benefit
plan covered by ERISA is offered, it should conform to the conceptual scheme
proposed herein.
113. The listed options are not exhaustive. For example, an option could be
that the participant agrees to mandatory administrative review only for claims under
$1,000.
114. To prevent strategic play, the opt-out ability of a participant would be
limited to a specified period each year, and would not be retroactive to a dispute
already existing.
115. The idea is to prohibit and/or limit, via regulation, robustness rules that
are so weak that they are presumptively undesirable. See infra Part III.C. Calls for
potent regulatory safeguards in markets generally have become stronger in light of the
recent financial meltdowns, for which regulatory failure was identified as a key culprit.
See, e.g., Roger Altman, Modem History's Greatest Regulatory Failure, FIN. TIMES
(London), Sept. 17, 2008 availableathttp://www.ft.comlcms/s/O/ldc86ec4-84ce-1lddb148-0000779fdl 8c,dwp uuid= 11f94e6e-7e94-1ldd-blaf-000077b07658.html
(attributing America's financial meltdown to "the greatest regulatory failure in modem
history"); Francis Fukuyama, The Fall of America, Inc., NEWSWEEK.COM, Oct. 4,
2008, http://www.newsweek.com/id/162401
("Washington failed to adequately
regulate the financial sector and allowed it to do tremendous harm to the rest of the
society."); Sam Zuckerman, Finance Sector Enters New Era of Regulation, S.F.
CHRON., Oct. 5, 2008, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgibin/article.cgi?f=/c/
a/2008/10/05/ MNF013 AB1O.DTL ("Amid the wreckage of the U.S. financial system
... the new era of finance will be one of much greater regulation and much less
risk. ").

684

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
A. The Attraction of a Robustness Market

The conceit central to all markets is that the buyers and sellers of a
good are in the best position to value it." 6 Here the "good" is benefitpromise robustness sold and bought in the form of remedial legal rules.
The seller of robustness is the benefit promisor; the buyer is the
beneficiary.
Consider the robustness associated with the legal standard of
judicial review. De novo review offers stronger protection of the
benefit promise than deferential review; the former reduces the chance
that indolent or biased administrators will wrongfully deny a promised
benefit. But de novo review is also more costly to benefit promisors,
because the scope (and thus cost) of litigation is broader than under
deferential review, and because they are less likely to prevail than
under deferential review." 7 Which rule-that is, how "much" judicial
review-is preferable?
The answer is that it depends on the actual magnitude of the
robustness increase associated with de novo review over deferential
review, the magnitude of the corresponding increase in cost, and the
content of the individual players' preferences. A robustness market is
an attractive means of answering those questions because the players
would be economically forced to determine their true preferences and
value the options on the table as accurately as possible.
Imagine a hypothetical health-care plan that offers all beneficiaries
a de novo review option and a deferential-review option (with
correspondingly different premiums). 8 The plan (or its insurer) would
price the differing options based on the expected cost difference in
administering a plan under the different robustness rules. Participants,
in turn, would compare the premium price differential to the perceived
risk of benefit denial associated with each option. Those who chose de
novo review would value the incremental robustness increase more than
the foregone wages associated with more costly premiums; those
selecting deferential review would value increased wages more than the
robustness decrease. Currently this robustness choice is determined by
judges-with no reliable reference to (1) the true incremental increase
or decrease in robustness, or (2) the true cost of the robustness
116. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 11 (4th ed. 1992)
("By a process of voluntary exchange, resources are shifted to those uses in which the
value to the customer, as measured by willingness to pay, is highest.").
117. This cost is likely expressed in the form of wage reduction, benefit
reduction, or benefit elimination. See supra Part I.B.
118. I use a welfare-plan example, see supra note 14, for ease of discussion.
But, the principle is not confined to welfare plans. As mentioned previously, however,
implementation specifics will vary with circumstance. See supranote 110.
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change.' 19 Judges, in essence, make broad guesses that deferential
review is not that much worse than de novo review in terms of a
decrease in robustness, but that it is much more costly in terms of
increasing promise cost. 21 Market players-who internalize the
consequences, positive and negative, of choosing respective rules-are
better able to value the trade-off (and with more precision).
Judges are also limited because their determinations are divorced
from circumstantial variations that alter rule value. Consider that for
beneficiaries who are participants in a plan that engages hard-working,
studiously neutral administrators, the value of the increased robustness
associated with de novo review is likely to be low. For beneficiaries
who are participants in a plan that engages lazy, biased administrators,
the value of the increased robustness associated with de novo review is
likely to be very high. Circumstances vary, and individual players are
better situated to factor such information into the bargaining that would
occur in a robustness market. Judges, in contrast, have information
about only those instances before them and must guess about the rest.
Moreover, even if a judge had perfect information about the actual
incremental change in robustness and cost in a given circumstance-for
example, how often de novo review would result in a different benefit
decision than deferential review-the current scheme does not align
individual preferences.'
Neither employees nor employers are all
alike. Employees and employers have differing compensation and risk
preferences among their own populations. Some employees might
prefer a more costly plan (i.e., lower wages) with a more robust
promise; others might prefer a less costly plan (i.e., higher wages) with
a less robust promise. 122 Similarly, employers have differing views of
promise cost. Employers concerned with being overturned frequently
would charge more for the de novo judicial-review option; employers
overturned less frequently would charge less. There are innumerable
details on which judgment and preference can differ. A robustness
market would permit players to better match their respective
119. Richard A. Epstein, Market and Regulatory Approaches to Medical
Malpractice: The Virginia Obstetrical No-Fault Statute, 74 VA. L. REv. 1451, 1455
(1988) (noting that public rules are made with "no real information about the subjective
preferences of the people whom they wish to protect").
120. Justice Breyer, for example, believes the difference in cost is elephantine.
See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
121.
Epstein, supra note 119, at 1455 (stating that public rules disregard
"individual differences in taste and demand").
122.
See, e.g., Russell Korobkin, The Efficiency of Managed Care "Patient
Protection" Laws: Incomplete Contracts, Bounded Rationality, and Market Failure, 85
CORNELL L. REv. 1, 26 (1999) (noting varying preferences for different combinations
of wages and insurance). Professor Korobkin is referring to the level of insurance
coverage, not robustness, but the principle is the same.
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preferences for a given combination of cost, wages, benefits, and
23
benefit robustness. 1
B. The PaternalisticBaseline: High Robustness
In theory, employees could bargain for increased robustness (if
they so desired) without legislative assistance. In practice, that will not
happen. Employees face disadvantages in information, expertise, and
risk tolerance, as well as collective-action problems. Absent
intervention, unfair (and insufficiently robust) bargains are likely to be
struck. This-along with a concomitant concern about the consequences
of broken benefit promises-is what prompted ERISA's passage in the
first instance. Bargaining differentials (and the socially undesirable
consequences of poor benefit bargains) specific to the labor market
remain today. 124
The complex nature of choosing among robustness rules suggests
anchored choice (i.e., where a concrete default option exists) is the
preferable choice architecture.' 25 Having the default rule as the one that
offers the most protection is consistent with the presumption of having
a protective statute in the first place. People who do not pay enough
attention to conduct a meaningful assessment of the risk of benefitpromise failure will be defaulted to the most robust option; people who
do pay attention to risk will easily be able to move to a less robust
option if the price is right. Part of the reason protective statutes such as
ERISA exist is because the former group exists.
Requiring all plans to offer the high-robustness option also
prevents the option from disappearing solely because of market
imperfections,
information asymmetries,
or bargaining-power
discrepancies.' 26 As a result of the default option being kept on the

123. Glen 0. Robinson, Rethinkang the Allocation of Medical Malpractice
Risks Between Patients and Providers,49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 173, 183 (1986)
("[Bargaining allows] the most efficient combination of efforts to manage risk in
accordance with their respective comparative advantages and their respective risk
preferences. ").
124. See, e.g., Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Meeting the Demands of Workers
into the Twenty-First Century." The Future of Labor and Employment Law, 68 IND.
L.J. 685, 688-95 (1993) (discussing employee bargaining problems).
125. Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, LibertarianPaternalismIs Not an
Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 1159, 1201 (2003) (noting that more complex decisions
are amenable to the use of a default option "that has been selected with some care").
126. That is, many employees may lack the awareness, ability, sophistication,
or incentives to insist on a high-robustness option. See, e.g., David Charny, The
Employee Welfare State in Transition, 74 TEX. L. REv. 1601, 1618 (1996) ("[I]t
appears that workers are not generally well-informed about particular aspects of firms'
pension, firing, and health and safety records.") In another setting, Professors Brown
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market, plans will be forced to price it for real, rather than merely
claiming (with no market consequence) to policy makers that it costs
some (unreliable) estimated amount.
Presumably, plans will also offer less robust remedial options at
lower prices, and through that process the price of robustness decreases
will be disaggregated and made more transparent. Any plan that offers
a less robust option will be effectively revealing the incremental cost it
attaches to a more highly robust option. Employees (and competitors)
will be able to see that at Company A, the default robustness option is
much more costly than it is at Company B.'27 That increased
transparency of incremental cost will assist employees (and employers)
in decision making regarding the selection of the optimal level of
robustness, benefits, and wages; it will also lead to pricing that is more
accurate.' 28 The freedom of plans to competitively price, and employees
to accept, less robust options will stimulate product differentiation in a
market where, originally, information asymmetries and bargainingpower differentials would have made the market uniform. The rise of a
granular, transparent market for remedial options of varying strength
will be better suited to satisfy individual preferences than the current

judge-centric scheme.
Aside from empowering the players to better effectuate their actual
preferences (which is true generally of increased product
differentiation),129 market-induced incremental pricing of robustness

would be of enormous use to policy makers. A market price on a given
robustness rule would obviously provide some real-world measure of

and Gopalan have shown that, owing to superior bargaining power of corporate
management, there is virtually no variance in corporate bargains struck between
shareholders and management regarding waivers of liability. J. Robert Brown, Jr. &
Sandeep Gopalan, Opting Only In: Contractarians, Waiver of Liability Provisions, and
the Race to the Bottom 3-4 (University of Denver, Legal Studies Research Paper No.
08-02, 2008), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1087404. This is evidence that
bargain diversity can quickly disappear where bargaining differentials exist.
127.
Cf Mark Geistfeld, Note, Imperfect Information, the PricingMechanism,
and ProductsLiability, 88 COLUM L. REv. 1057, 1062 (1988) ("By separating the price
charged for a product from the price charged for its warranty, a modified warranty
pricing system can help ensure that prices do convey useful information about product
risks to imperfectly informed consumers.").
128. Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of
Imperfect Information: A Legal andEconomic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 630, 656
(1979) ("If comparison shopping is convenient ... [and] if prices and terms in a
market are quoted in standard and relatively clear fashion, the market, other things
equal, is more likely than not to be competitive.").
129.
See, e.g., Thomas C. Arthur, The Costly Quest for Perfect Competition:
Kodak and Nonstructural Market Power, 69 N.Y.U. L. Rv. 1, 33-35 (1994)
(discussing the virtues of even modest product differentiation).
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the rule's cost and value. 3 ' The regulated-market price is not a perfect
metric, nor does it properly account for indirect costs associated with
the rule, such as additional use of judicial resources, but a regulated
market can provide some quanta of legitimate data on the cost and
popularity of a given rule.
Such data can assist policy makers in analyzing the social
desirability of the rule. Obviously, if the price is high but the rule is
deemed to further other policy ends (such as a fairness aim),
subsidization of a particular rule (by offering targeted tax credits of a
certain size) may be warranted to ensure that all individuals are capable
of choosing the rule. Alternately, if the rule's price is very low but
perceived to be socially desirable, the most sensible policy prescription
might be to require additional disclosures about the rule. In many cases,
no additional policy modification may be required: the market may get
it right.
Moreover, robustness price changes over time-particularly
compared to other changes-could reveal information of considerable
policy value. For example, if the price difference between a
consequential-damages option and a no-consequential-damages option
stays roughly flat across the aggregate market over a given period,
while health-care premiums otherwise rise over the same period, that
suggests that health-care costs have risen for reasons that are
independent of growth in damage awards. Conversely, if the average
price of the consequential-damages option skyrockets, that suggests
something has changed about the country's damage regime. Extracting
information from the market in this fashion will not be effortless, but it
will be far easier than doing so in today's priceless world. Ultimately,
market information is not perfect, and observers would need to be
careful to appropriately weigh the information conveyed by market
prices within a comprehensive policy prism. That caveat
notwithstanding, pricing information about robustness rules would be of
significant value.

130. See, e.g., Charles R. Plott & Kay-Yut, Information Aggregation
Mechanisms: Concept, Design and Implementation for a Sales ForecastingProblem 1
(Cal. Inst. of Tech., Social Science Working Paper No. 1131, 2002), available at
http://www.hpl.hp.com/personal/Kay-YutChen/paper/ms020408.pdf
("[P]rices
in
naturally occurring, free markets make important contributions to information
transmission in economies."); see generally F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in
Society, 35 AM. ECON. REv. 519, 525 (1945) (discussing how prices and markets
permit the communication of information and expression of choices in a dynamic
fashion).
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C. Sensible Restraints: Subsidies, Disclosure, Regulation
Any scheme that requires players to pay to exercise their
preferences runs the risk ot being unfair to those who lack means.
Here, one might be concerned that plans may very well price the
default option so highly that many lower-income individuals could not
afford it. A superior solution, it might be argued, would be to simply
amend ERISA to mandate high-robustness rules.131
I am sensitive to this concern, but offer two preliminary
observations. First, a mandated solution would force high-robustness
promises (with the expected resulting decrease in wages or benefits)132
on everyone, including individuals who prefer additional wages or
benefits to increased robustness. (This is true of a mandatory rule of
any type: it is not tailored to individual preferences.) Second, a
mandatory-robustness rule would undermine policy makers' efforts to
gather detailed information about the true price of robustness increases,
because there would be no extant price points in the market associated
with different levels of robustness. Neither of these two observations,
of course, is responsive to the social-justice concern that the less well
off will lack the wherewithal to purchase the default option (the option
with high robustness), and that is unfair and undesirable. The answer,
in my view, is to provide a government subsidy to those making benefit
choices. Such is consistent with most current plans for health reform,
for example, and would (assuming the price of the default option is not
exorbitantly high)133 permit individuals who prioritize a high level of
benefit-promise robustness to express that preference.
A further concern is that individuals' expressed preferences might
not reflect their true preferences as a result of misinformation or
misunderstanding. 34 ERISA's current rule is that summary plan
descriptions must be written in a language understandable by the
average plan participant. 35 This rule makes policy sense as it
131.
L. Darnell Weeden, An HMO Does Not Owe an ERISA Fiduciary Duty
to Its Employee Beneficiaries: After Pegram v. Herdrich, Who Will Speak for the
Working Class?, 23 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 381, 386 (2002) (stating that ERISA should
be amended to "use traditional common law liability concepts of torts, contracts, and
trusts" to protect beneficiaries and assure quality care).
132. See supra Part 1.B.
133. If it were, that would be relevant information to consider when deciding
whether to increase the size of applicable subsidies and to set policy generally.
134. Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, In Defense of Redistribution Through Private
Law, 91 MINN. L. REv. 326, 330 (2006) ("Fulfillment of people's actual preferences
might result in a reduction in their welfare, if their desires are based on
misinformation, mistakes, or lack of self-respect and self-esteem.").
135. See supra note 97. If there is a conflict between the two, summary plan
description language trumps contrary plan language. Id.
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significantly enhances the chance that beneficiaries understand the
terms of the benefit deal. So too it should be the case with respect to
robustness rules. Plans would have to explain in comprehensible
English the difference between the default high-robustness option and
less robust options being offered. 136
Beginning with a highly robust option also achieves important
nudging effects that will ameliorate other cognitive shortcomings that
might otherwise, tabula rosa, result in suboptimal choices for a given
person.137 Setting the default as the most protective option and requiring
moves away from it to be explained in clear English protects against
poor decision making, but also leaves room for strong, informed
choices (and the corresponding benefits of permitting choice
obtainment) to manifest themselves.138
A final worry is that, in general, a small number of weaker players
might be unjustly exploited, notwithstanding the high-robustness
default, clear disclosure rules, and subsidies. For example, plans might
offer heavy discounts for an extremely weak robustness option, (e.g.,
much lower premiums for a health-care plan that permits judicial
review but requires the beneficiary to pay, up front, the cost of the
plan's attorneys in any dispute). The solution is to establish a regulatory
floor (determined by the Department of Labor) as to the weakness of
robustness options that may be permissibly reached through
bargaining. 39 An initial floor of (1) no consequential damages, (2)
Glenn review of administrator decisions, and (3) judicial deference to
administrator decisions is a sensible starting point. 1" The Department

136. Indeed, one modest advantage of the proposal is that all beneficiaries
would be aware, ex ante, that robustness rules exist. Currently, beneficiaries only learn
about robustness rules (and how unfavorable they can be) after they have a claim
dispute.
137. Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 125, at 1159 ("Often people's preferences
are unclear and ill-formed, and their choices will inevitably be influenced by default
rules, framing effects, and starting points.").
138. Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral
Economics and the Case for "Asymmetric Paternalism," 151 U. PA. L. REv. 1211,
1212 (2003) ("A regulation is asymmetrically paternalistic if it creates large benefits for
those who make errors, while imposing little or no harm on those who are fully
rational. Such regulations are relatively harmless to those who reliably make decisions
in their best interest, while at the same time advantageous to those making suboptimal
choices.").
139. Jeffrey O'Connell, Pragmatic Constraints on Market Approaches. A
Response to Professor Epstein, 74 VA. L. REv. 1475, 1483 (1988) (discussing
regulatory limits on contractual variations).
140. That is, after all, the current set of rules. While they are, in my view,
undesirable, they are not so grossly unfair that they should be barred from the market. I
do not here resolve conclusively the acceptable floor, because that would necessarily be
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would be authorized to raise or lower the floor depending on a to-bedetermined set of circumstantial conditions, such as, for example, (1)
company size, (2) beneficiary income level, and (3) rate of judicial
reversal of plan decisions. A regulatory floor subject to limited
modification based on agency discretion would serve as an appropriate
but flexible safeguard against grossly undesirable bargaining outcomes.
CONCLUSION

America's benefit system is on the precipice of a significant

change. There is a political appetite for reform,"' there is an emerging
policy consensus that some combination of regulated choice and
additional government expenditure is desirable, 142 and there is a
protecting
widespread legal view that ERISA's central objective of
43
1
judiciary.
uncooperative
an
by
frustrated
been
benefits has
a function of political realities (and compromises), the consideration of which is beyond
this Article's scope.
See, e.g., Amanda Gardner, Report Compares Health-Care Platforms of
141.
PresidentialCandidates, WASH. POST, Oct. 2, 2008 ("Currently, some 82 percent of
Americans think the health-care system either has to be rebuilt completely or needs to
undergo a massive overhaul."). The urgency and depth of the desire for reform,
particularly in health care, is evidenced by the rise of bipartisan policy groups
demanding action, such as DividedWeFail.Org. The group is a bipartisan policy
coalition (consisting of AARP, Business Roundtable, Service Employees Union, and
National Federation of Independent Business) devoted to "engaging the American
people, businesses, non-profit organizations, and elected officials in finding bi-partisan
solutions to ensure affordable, quality health care and long-term financial security-for
all of us." AARP.org, About Us, http://www.aarp.org/issues/dividedwefail/aboutus
(last visited Mar. 4, 2009).
142. For example, in their health-care-reform plans, both 2008 presidential
candidates Obama and McCain urged some level of choice and competition, and agreed
that some level of government expenditures (be it through subsidies or credits) was
warranted to ensure that poorer Americans were able to select reasonable options for
the provision of their health-care and retirement benefits. See BARACK OBAMA AND JOE
BIDEN'S PLAN TO LOWER HEALTH CARE COSTS AND ENSURE AFFORDABLE, ACCESSIBLE
available at http://www.barack
ALL
(2008),
FOR
COVERAGE
HEALTH

obama.com/pdf/issues/HealthCareFullPlan.pdf (proposing, inter alia, choice and
subsidies); STRAIGHT TALK ON HEALTH SYSTEM REFORM (2008), available at
inter
(proposing,
http://www.allhealth.org/BriefmgMaterials/McCainPlan-1222.pdf
alia, choice and tax credits); see also Mark V. Pauly, Blending Better Ingredients for
Health Reform, HEALTHAFFAIRS.ORG, Sept. 16, 2008, http://content.healthaffairs.org/
cgi/reprint/hlthaff.27.6.w482v1 (noting that similarities between the McCain and
Obama plans include a "desire to offer a range of insurance options to the currently
uninsured and a desire to redistribute the help and incentives government gives for
insurance purchasing"). Obviously the candidates had significant differences, but their
commonalities are important.
143. See generally Bronsteen et al., supra note 6; Langbein, Trust Law, supra
note 5; see also Jana K. Strain & Eleanor D. Kinney, The Road Paved with Good
Intentions: Problems and Potential for Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance Under

692

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

My proposal is consistent with these realities. Rather than
permitting the continuance of implicit and uncertain policy making by
judges ill equipped for the task, I propose changing the system. Begin
with a paternalistic default option of high benefit-promise robustnessconsequential damages, elective administrative review, and de novo
judicial review-and allow the relevant players to bargain, at decreased
prices, for alternate remedial rules of lesser strength. To address
bargaining-power discrepancies, information asymmetry, and cognitive
biases, make the default option a required option, preserve the current
requirement that a change in benefits must be written in a way
comprehensible to the average beneficiary, and establish a regulatory
floor. To address financial inequity, subsidize the choices of poorer
Americans.
The ninety-third Congress, which enacted ERISA, was
fundamentally right to instantiate minimum standards to strengthen the
benefit promise, even at increased cost. Its policy failure was to leave
unspecified the degree to which higher cost should be tolerated.
Groping for an answer, the judiciary has embraced strained statutory
readings in tension with ERISA's explicit protective purpose. Nor, in
any event, could the judiciary realistically fashion an answer
sufficiently granular to be responsive to individual preferences. In
contrast, a regulated robustness market is capable of striking an
appropriate and fluid balance between the competing policy objectives
of promise security and promise cost-with a thumb on the scale
favoring security. Which, of course, was ERISA's aim in the first
place.

ERISA, 31 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 29, 68 (1999) ("Congress has failed to meet its own
purpose of providing protection for participants and beneficiaries and must act to
remedy this dreadful state."). Often criticized in tandem with ERISA's narrow view of
remedies is the broadly expansive view of preemption the Supreme Court has taken,
further undermining ERISA's protective aims. See, e.g., Catherine L. Fisk, The Last
Article About the Language of ERISA Preemption?. A Case Study of the Failure of
Textualism, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 35, 38 (1996) ("It is a rich irony that ERISA, which
was heralded at its enactment as significant federal protective legislation, has through
its preemption provision been the basis for invalidating scores of progressive state
laws."); Dana M. Muir, Contemporary Social Policy Analysis and Employee Benefit
Programs: Boomers, Benefits, and Bargains, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1351, 1356
(1997) ("ERISA's broad preemptive force intersects with its narrowly construed
substantive provisions to create regulatory voids that undermine the security of current
benefit promises.").

